I. Introduction
This paper reports on laboratory experimental research designed to study the behavioral properties of two different market environments governed by cycling excess demand: (1) a market in which successive market periods are temporally isolated (autarky), and (2) a market in which agents (speculators) are allowed to carry commodity units from one period to another, thus temporally linking the cyclical phases of the market. We analyze observations from a total of 18 markets, all organized under double auction trading rules. The markets employ the PLATO computer network as the medium of public information transfer and private information display.
Our research builds on the previous experimental findings of Miller, Plott, and Smith (1977) (hereinafter MPS) and Williams (1979) . These studies employed a common design where a sequence of "trading years" governed by stable supply are divided into a blue (low-demand) season and a yellow (high-demand) season. The supply and demand arrays were cyclically stable and resulted in a unique intertemporal competitive equilibrium. The experiments employed six This study reports the results of 18 computerized "double-auction" market experiments characterized by cycling excess demand. Two such market designs are studied: one with stationary supply and cycling demand, the other with cycling supply and demand. Data from a series of control experiments under conditions of intertemporal isolation (autarky) are compared with data from experiments where the two cyclical market phases are linked by a subset of agents (speculators). Allowing intertemporal speculation is found to be a significant treatment variable in both market designs; however, price convergence patterns are not robust with respect to the design change.
II. The PLATO Double-Auction Exchange Mechanism with Traders

Basic Trading Mechanics
The trading procedure employed in this study is a revised version of the PLATO computerized transformation of the oral double auction described in detail by Williams (1980) . Buyers (sellers) are free at any time to enter a bid to buy (offer to sell) one unit of an undefined homogeneous commodity by typing their entry and then touching a rectangular area on their display screen (see fig. 1 ) labeled "ENTER BID" ("ENTER OFFER") at which time the entry is made public unless it violates some institutional rule. Any buyer (seller) is free to accept any seller's offer (buyer's bid) by touching a display screen area labeled "ACCEPT OFFER" ("ACCEPT BID"). The acceptor must then touch an area labeled "CONFIRM CONTRACT," at which time a binding contract is formed and the information is logged in both the maker's and taker's private record sheets. Bids, offers, and subsequent contracts are the only public information. The incorporation of PLATO'S touch sensitive display screen into the double-auction software is not just an exercise in computer showmanship. The utilization of touch input serves to reduce the complexity of the task market participants confront. They are able to prepare a price quote for entry into the market and then to focus all their attention on the market information continually being presented on their display screen. Price quotes must progress so as to reduce the bid-ask spread. Only the highest bid to buy and the lowest offer to sell are displayed to the entire market and are open to acceptance. Any quotation that does not provide better terms to the other side of the market is placed in a queue that ranks bids from highest to lowest (offers from lowest to highest). After a contract occurs the highest queued bid and the lowest queued offer are automatically entered as the new bid-ask spread. The maker of a queued price quote is given continuously updated information on the quote's position in the queue. Queued entries may be withdrawn at any time by pressing a key labeled -EDIT-.2
Trading occurs over a maximum of 15 market periods each lasting a prespecified number of seconds (either 300 or 330 in the experiments reported below.) The market participants can bypass this stopping rule by unanimously voting to end a period. Registering a vote to end a trading period does not affect the individual's ability to participate 2. Smith and Williams (1983b) found that this variation of the basic PLATO doubleauction mechanism, which incorporates an electronic limit order file or "specialist's book" (the bid and offer queues) with the bid-ask spread reduction rule, tends to outperform several other computerized double auctions in price stability and the rapidity of convergence to the competitive equilibrium. actively in the market. The number of seconds remaining and the current vote to end the period are presented as shown at the bottom of figure 1 and are updated about every 1 or 2 seconds.
Speculation Mechanics3
Market participants designated as traders have the unique ability to switch from buying mode to selling mode at any time by pressing a key labeled -DATA-. Traders are given a capital endowment to cover their initial inventory investment and can add to (subtract from) this amount over the course of the experiment by accumulating profits (incurring losses) from buying and then reselling commodity units for their own accounts.4 Traders are paid in cash the amount of their final working capital defined as the capital endowment plus any accumulated profits or losses. The perishability of the commodity units is given by a preinitialized "unit life," which determines the maximum number of periods that an inventory unit can be carried before it "expires." For example, if the unit life is set to three, as in the design II experiments reported below, a unit purchased during trading period 1 would expire at the end of trading period 4. Any inventory unit that expires is automatically sold at a pre-initialized scrap value and the resulting loss is subtracted from the trader's working capital. The scrap-value parameter allows us to normalize for the risk associated with inventory accumulation, when replicating specific supply and demand configurations that have been shifted by an arbitrary constant in order to disguise a design previously used within a given subject population. If at the end of any period a trader's working capital falls to zero he or she is automatically eliminated from the market and receives zero profit. Traders are informed of the final market period at the end of period X where X = (final period -unit life). At the end of the experiment all remaining inventory units are reimbursed at scrap value regardless of the period in which they were purchased.
When a trader buys a commodity unit the price and the period of purchase are logged in the trader's inventory table, as shown in figure 1. Inventory accumulation is governed by a financial inventory constraint and a physical inventory constraint. The financial constraint states that traders can continue accumulating inventory units as long as their working capital exceeds their total inventory cost net of scrap value (displayed on the trader's screen at all times). In other words, for the trader to continue buying, the working capital must cover the loss that would be incurred if all currently held inventory units were to expire and be sold for their scrap value. We thus limit the amount of credit available to the traders. A physical inventory constraint exists because a maximum of seven units will fit in the inventory table given the horizontal space limitations of the display screen.
Traders' inventories are automatically maintained on a first in-first out basis. When an inventory unit is sold the unit is removed from the inventory table and the sale price, purchase price, and resulting profit are recorded in the trader's record sheet under the period in which the sale was made. Traders are limited to a maximum of five sales in any single period, again because the screen display area is limited.
III. Experimental Subjects
All of the experiments reported in the following sections use subjects drawn from the undergraduate and graduate student populations at the University of Arizona in Tucson and Indiana University in Bloomington. Most subjects were drawn from undergraduate economic theory classes. Many of the experiments were run "multisite" with subjects participating simultaneously at both locations. Except where explicitly noted, all subjects were experienced in the sense that they had participated in at least one previous double-auction experiment (with completely different market parameters) and had shown no significant problem grasping the institutional rules or trading mechanics of the computerized marketplace.5 Experienced subjects are usually recruited by telephone, since they indicated a desire to participate again in such experiments by leaving their phone number with the experimenter at the conclusion of the first experiment. Our revolunteer rate is nearly 100%.
After arriving at the experiment site, participants are each paid $3 for keeping their appointment and are then randomly assigned to individual PLATO computer terminals. The double-auction program then (1) assigns each terminal to the condition of buyer, seller, or trader, (2) presents the instructions at an individually controlled pace, and (3) executes the experiment and stores the resulting data on disk for later recall and analysis. The role of buyer and seller were assigned randomly by PLATO. In the speculation experiments, however, the assignment of the trader's role was not random. Because of the complexity of the task confronted by traders, we chose for this role persons who were either very experienced with the basic mechanism or were otherwise considered unlikely to have difficulty understanding the mechanics of being a trader. In experiments I t-I and I t-2 reported below, two traders participated in the market in addition to the four buyers and sellers. The traders were given a $5 capital endowment to cover their initial purchases. The commodity perishability parameter (unit life) was set to allow commodity units to be carried over a maximum of two trading periods beyond the period purchased. The scrap value was set at $1.7 Experiments la-i and la-2 are autarkic markets replicating experiments It-I and It-2, but with no traders.
Experimental Results
The upper part of figure 2 displays sequential contract prices and descriptive statistics for experiment It-i. The rapidity with which prices converge to a range very close to P* is striking. The seasonal price fluctuations predicted under autarky are almost nonexistent from the very beginning of the experiment. There are 132 contracts over the seven market cycles in periods 1-14, compared with 126 contracts predicted by the intertemporal competitive model. Traders are involved in 53% (70) of the contracts, somewhat more than the 44.4%
6. The earlier studies cited used six buyers and six sellers, each having two units potentially traded.
7. The MPS and Williams studies used a $3 capital endowment and had no scrap-value parameter. Our design I supply and demand arrays have been shifted up by a constant of $1 (our scrap value) relative to those used in these earlier studies. (eight of every 18) predicted at the theoretical intertemporal equilibrium price. The lower part of figure 2 displays the level of traders' inventories after each contract occurs. It follows that if a contract is plotted as an open circle (a trader was involved in the exchange) there must be a corresponding increase or decrease in a trader's inventory. We see that the traders were immediately active in the market, being involved in five of the first seven contracts. Note that a unit purchased by trader 1 during the first period was sold the same period. The practice of intraperiod trading became quite common throughout the entire experiment, since the traders were able to gain the 5-cent commission for sales of inventory units regardless of the capital gain.8 There are even instances where traders are on both ends of an exchange (e.g., the sixth contract in period 8.) The "doomsday" effect built into the market by having all inventory units expire after the final trading period is evident in the period 15 price series. When the traders reduce their usual oddperiod purchasing, prices immediately drop toward the autarkic equilibrium.
Figure 3 displays sequential contract prices, traders' inventory levels, and descriptive statistics for experiment It-2. The price variance is much greater and convergence toward P* much slower than in experiment It-i. With the exception of periods 2 and 4, prices tend to lag away from P* in the direction of the autarkic equilibrium. By the seventh complete market cycle (periods 13 and 14) prices appear to have stabilized near P*. As in experiment It-i, the built-in doomsday effect is evident in period 15 where prices clearly diverge from P* toward P. Over periods 1-14 traders are involved in 43% (52) of the 121 total contracts. Both total exchange volume and the percentage of contracts involving traders are less than the theoretical prediction as well as what was observed in experiment It-i.
Figures 4 and 5 display sequential contract prices and descriptive statistics for experiment la-i and experiment la-2 (design I, autarky), respectively. Prices in both markets display a clear tendency to lag behind the cyclical demand shifts, converging toward P0 from above in the odd periods and toward P0 from below in the even periods. This "hysteresis" effect was also present in the autarky experiment conducted by Williams (1979) and in two experiments with growing demand reported by Smith (1980) and to some extent in experiments with 8. Elsewhere (Smith and Williams 1983a), we report experimental results in which participants can be interpreted as revealing the subjective cost associated with doubleauction trading. This measure indicates that such costs average between 5 and 10 cents per trade. However, many trades occur that yield a gain of less than 5 cents, indicating that for some individuals a 5-cent commission is more than sufficient compensation for transactions costs. Note that the first contract in periods 2-15 of experiment la-I occurs in the 10-cent interval centered on $3.75. From this starting point slightly below P* prices tend to move toward the relevant autarkic equilibrium. The first price in each period is less stable in experiment la-2 but the general tendency for the price series to be negatively (positively) sloped during odd (even) periods is evident. In both experiments, monotonicity of price changes is somewhat more evident in odd periods than in even periods. The sustained lagging of price series throughout both autarky experiments suggest that a behavioral equilibrium may be characterized by a nonzero variance price pattern rather than the fixed price equilibrium of traditional competitive price theory. In spite of the informational and procedural differences introduced by the computerized trading environment, these results strongly support the basic conclusion that the existence of speculative agents tends to reduce price fluctuations in a market governed by cyclical demand and stationary supply. This result holds for a comparison either with autarky-theoretic prices or with actual observed autarky prices even in the presence of a very pronounced hysteresis effect.
A second and perhaps more important criterion for the comparison of market performance in the two treatment groups is allocative efficiency. Table 2 
V. Fourteen Markets with Cycling Demand and Supply
Having demonstrated an ability to replicate the basic results of the previous double-auction speculation and autarky experiments using our subject pool and computerized trading mechanism, we now turn to an investigation of the behavioral characteristics of speculative and autarkic markets governed by an entirely new cyclical market design.
Experimental Design 11
Figure 6 displays the market supply and demand configurations induced on four buyers and four sellers in design II. This design is characterized by a stable cycling of both the supply and demand arrays where (D', SO) = (Do + 1.80, SO + 1.80). Note that the autarkic and intertemporal equilibrium prices are not unique but are defined over a 10-cent interval centered on PF, PF, and P*, where P* = (PO + .80) = (P" -.80). The autarkic and intertemporal competitive quantities are Q= Q, = 7 and Q* = 11 with nine units carried over from each odd to the next even period by traders. The autarkic price spread is thus double that of design I and the optimal carry-over is one unit more than double that in design I. In all of the design II experiments traders were given a capital endowment of $10. The unit life was set for three periods and the scrap value was set at (P* -1.80). Each trading period lasted 330 seconds and, unlike the design I experiments, no commission was paid on traded units. Table 3 PLATO double-auction trading mechanics; the exception was experiment 2t-3, which employed inexperienced buyers and sellers but experienced speculators. In experiments 2tp-1 through 2tp-4 all subjects were given access between trading periods to a table containing the quantity exchanged and the average, highest, and lowest contract price in all previous periods. The reasoning behind the introduction of this additional information will become clear in the next section. With the exception of experiments 2t-5 and 2tp-2 (which were terminated because of computer problems) the final period of trading was governed by a 2-hour time limit on our exclusive use of the PLATO facilities at our respective institutions.
Experimental Results
Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c plot the sequence of mean contract prices and the quantity exchanged for all 14 of the design II experiments. One observation that is immediately clear from figures 7a and 7b is that the rapid convergence of speculative market prices to the intertemporal competitive equilibrium, so apparent in experiment It, is not generally observed using the design II parameters. Experiment 2t-2 is the only market that appears to have stabilized at a price near (actually slightly below) P*. The other nine speculation experiments exhibit various degrees of partial convergence to P*; however, mean prices are clearly closer to P* than in the four autarky experiments (fig. 7a ). This conclusion is supported by figure 8, which displays 99% confidence bands for the mean contract price in each trading period for both the pooled speculation and pooled autarky samples. Note that the bands do not period contract prices can be characterized as symmetric with mean, median, and mode at the midpoint of the range of autarkic competitive equilibrium prices. In sharp contrast with this, the distribution of evenperiod prices can be characterized as asymmetric (downward skewed) with a mean 2.1 cents below the minimum of the range of competitive equilibrium prices and a median and mode at the minimum competitive equilibrium price. A comparison of the two sample distributions, expressed as deviations from the appropriate autarkic equilibrium price, yields Zu = 6.473 (reject the null hypothesis, p < .01). The data clearly indicate that the hysteresis effect, noted in experiment la, is present in the even-period data but not in the odd-period data. We find this rather surprising and offer no formal behavioral-theoretic explanation for this empirical result.10 We can, however, point out that this phenomenon can be interpreted as consistent with recent experimental evidence offered by us (Smith and Williams 1982) in support of what we might call a "weak-sellers" hypothesis. This simply states that, over a large number of experimental replications, there appears to be a tendency for contract prices to converge to a static, symmetric-rent, competitive equilibrium from below and that this effect can combine with certain design parameters (e.g., the distribution of exchange surplus) to determine the observed price convergence path. One explanation of the dissimilarities displayed by the figure 9 frequency polygons is that the weak-seller effect tends to offset the lagging of prices above P( predicted by the hysteresis effect during odd periods. But the weak-seller 10. A comparison of pooled price data from market cycles 5-7 of the two design I autarky experiments shows that there is no significant difference in the mean absolute price deviation from P* across market phases (Zu = .41). Significantly higher price variance is, however, observed in even periods (F78.44 = 2.8) relative to odd periods. and hysteresis effects combine during even periods to produce the distinct lagging of prices below P". An alternative explanation is that the first phase of the market cycle is somehow weighted more heavily than the second in the price expectation formation process. This could easily be tested by conducting a set of experiments with the cyclical phases reversed. Figures 10, 11 , 12, and 13 display the actual sequence of contract prices and descriptive statistics for autarky experiments 2a-1, 2a-2, 2a-3, and 2a-4, respectively. Note that the markets are extremely efficient regardless of the cyclical phase. Prices in 2a-1 exhibit a hysteresis effect in both the odd-period and even-period phases. However, price convergence in 2a-2 and 2a-3 is generally from below in both cyclical phases. Market prices in 2a-4 converge very rapidly to the upper (lower) bound of the odd (even) period range of competitive equilibrium prices.
From figure 7b we note that experiments 2t-1 through 2t-6 display varying degrees of partial convergence to P*. After we conducted these first six speculation experiments it seemed apparent that traders were quite frequently not fully aware of the market's cyclical nature or the opportunities for profit available to them through interperiod carryover of inventories. In an attempt to help focus the subjects' attention on the low-high (odd-even) price cycle we decided to provide them Pi(t) the ith contract price in trading period t; Q the total quantity exchanged during period t; P*--intertemporal competitive equilibrium price; and I = 1 if summary price information was provided, 0 otherwise.
Thus, the price series in a particular period of trading is "close" to P* only if the price variance is low and the mean price is near P*. Leastsquares estimation of the equation specified above yields: The rather surprising result is that the presentation of summary price information tends to retard slightly, rather than to speed up, the rate of price convergence to P*. Both sets of experiments start the convergence process from an ot value very close to .75 (note that the minimum autarkic equilibrium price spread is -.75 to + .75 in fig. 4 ). Choosing a target value of (x = .05 (the range of intertemporal equilibrium prices is from -.05 to + .05) we find that (x would decay to the target value after 25 periods of trading under the "no summary information" treatment and after 38 periods of trading when summary information is provided. The substantial variation in prices generated during the final market cycles of the speculation experiments is illustrated by the separate oddand even-period frequency polygons and descriptive summary statistics for pooled period 9-14 data, shown in figure 14.
Figures 15-18 plot the sequence of contract prices, each trader's inventory level, and descriptive statistics for speculation experiments 2t-1, 2t-2, 2t-3, and 2tp-3, respectively. In experiment 2t-1 we observe a partial elimination of the autarkic price spread with prices being fairly stable during the sixth market cycle (periods 11 and 12) at (P0 + .27) and (P0 -.41). It is tempting to conjecture that the traders were sophisticated enough to realize that it was in their combined best interest to maintain such a price spread.'2 However, the reason for its existence is clear after examining the sequence of traders' inventory levels presented in the lower part of figure 15. We note that trader 1 was responsible for most of the successful speculative activity in this market and that trader 2 was, after repeated losses, almost completely inactive over the last two market cycles. The net aggregate change in traders' inventories, starting with period 1, is +2, +2, + 1, -1, +4, -6, + 5, -6, + 4, -5, + 5, -5. This is insufficient to eliminate the cyclical price swings.
Trader 1 is very conservative over the first two market cycles, buying and then selling one unit in both periods 1 and 2. He then carries one unit over from period 3 to period 4, earns a sizable profit ($1.60) on this unit, and then falls into a pattern of buying in the odd periods and 12. The price spread that would maximize traders' joint profits is (P(, + .35) -(P" -.35) with a total of six units carried over from each odd-to each even-numbered period. Figure 17 displays the price and inventory data from experiment 2t-3 which exhibits partial convergence to P* even though three traders were operating in the market. Net inventory changes for periods 1-14 are +4, -3, +6, -6, +8, -5, +7, -5, +7, -8, +6, -8, +7, -9. In this market trader 2 is almost totally inactive throughout the entire experiment but does manage to lose $2 of his $10 starting capital. In contrast to this, trader 1 is a very successful speculator earning $21.71 by the end of period 14. Trader 1 failed to unload all of his inventory units during the final period of trading and consequently is forced to absorb a $2.75 loss for selling a unit at scrap value. Trader 1 commented after the experiment that he had mistakenly purchased a unit at the beginning of period 14 when he meant to sell. This raised his inventory level to six units and since the maximum number of sales in any one period is limited to five, he was forced ultimately to pay for his error. Trader 3 is also quite successful in his speculative activities, earning $24.60 during the experiment. Figure 18 plots price and inventory data from experiment 2tp-3 where all subjects were provided summary price information between Table 4 presents a pooled autarkic-speculative market efficiency comparison. The speculative markets generate a higher mean efficiency in all trading periods except period 5 (when they are almost identical). A matched pairs t-test using the mean value of E? given in table 4 yields t(13) = 5.183. The design II parameters are such that at the autarkic competitive equilibria buyers and sellers split $6.20 in surplus equally each period. At the intertemporal competitive equilibrium, total surplus available is $10.45, with buyers (sellers) receiving $.35 and sellers (buyers) receiving $10.10 during each odd (even) trading period. Thus, an E value of 100 implies a corresponding E* value of 59.33 and an E* value of 100 implies an E? value of 168.55. Except for period 5, the mean efficiency in the speculative markets exceeds the maximum possible efficiency in an autarkic market (E = 100, E* = 59.33). Also, it is instructive to note the low-high (odd-even) efficiency cycle in the speculation experiments. This is due to the fact that purchases by traders were generally made in odd (low price) periods and resulted in an immediate profit only for the seller. Traders generally made profits on the sale of inventory units in even (high-price) periods.
VI. Summary
Using observations from two cyclical market designs, we have shown that the inclusion of a class of speculative agents tends to reduce significantly the observed magnitude of cyclical price swings relative to those observed in markets without intertemporal speculation. Including speculators also results in a significant increase in market efficiency.
In a market with shifting demand and stable supply (design I) we observe convergence toward the zero excess demand intertemporal equilibrium price when speculative agents are active in the market. Without speculators, prices display a marked lagging in the adjustment from one cyclical phase to the other. When a considerably different market design with shifting supply and demand is used (design II), prices do not generally converge to the intertemporal competitive equilibrium within the seven-cycle duration of most experiments. This slow rate of price convergence is attributed to risk-averse behavior by speculators, resulting in intertemporal carry-over below the socially optimal level. Without speculators, prices tend to cycle between the two (autarkic) equilibria. An investigation of the price series and resulting frequency distributions generated in odd (low-price) and even (high-price) periods shows a tendency for prices to lag somewhat below the competitive equilibrium during even periods but not during odd periods. An informal explanation is offered to account for this empirical phenomenon.
